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It tea been stoted that pcwer is to the study of laterns tlots 1 re1stlens
whet mossy Is to the otutiy of eeonanice, s nsecs to so end* If one ecoepts
this idee, then en approach to the study of contemporary world politics Is
immed lately suggested. In such en approach, power would be ts'*mn as the
constant in which both means and ends would be msaeured end coMpared; ether
elements such ss Ideology would be considered as variables. Ideology fits
this technique of enslysis well since it is usually present in some form
end differences in the content of ideologies seen to be related to differ-
ences in the power relationship of nation* in the contemporary world. The
examination of the relative importance and interrelation of ideology end
power will be accomplished In three steps. First, those areas of the world
where the same or similar ideologies exist will be clarified end named,
the types of ideology and power in these blocs will be considered here.
Second, the relationship of ideology end power within the blocs themselves
will be examined. Third, the interrelation between the blocs, their ideo-
logies sad their relative power will be examined ss part of the conclusion.
The choice of Ideology aa a variable and power ea a constant is not
limited to Wclfers. Stomasinger states that Ideology serves the peculiar
2function of Justifying power end trensforaing it into authority. Murgenthau
else advocates this type of concept of the relation between ideology end
J wolfera, Discord snd Collaboration, Baltimore, 1962, pg. 105
* Stones inger, fee Might of nations"; Maw York, 1961, pg. 28
-1-
wee*
power. "Ideology rentiers lnvolvesnnt In the contest for power psycholog-
ically and morally acceptable to the actors ee well as the audience.
Pro* the writings of aueh authors, one can see that there hee already been
HRich consideration of the interrelationship of ideology and" power in inter*
national relations* What has been done though is raere along the line of
pragantie attempts to devise workable approaches to international affairs
so as to facilitate the finding of solutions to current and future foreign
affairs problem* This may be considered es a technician's approach vice
that of a scholar. Ibis is not to say that the approach of such persona
is net thorough end analytical, but rather that the terse in which these
approaches are couched ere designed to facilitate their use, upon completion,
by others. The audience for which these wor'« »r9 directed include poli-
ticians, diploraats, Ideologues (ectivist intellectuals) and students.
Whether these students arm destined to be scholars or technicians is s noot
point. The greatest shortcoming free which studies of this type suffer is
that of personal value and goal Judgments by the author, This is not to
cendesm velue end goal orientations by authors, but rather to stress that
in any work in which this is present one oust be alert to understand the
authors orientation and sake eppropriste allowances for it. Una simplest
teat for wore of this type is found in the conclusion. The presence here
of reccesaendations for setion end desirous predictions is e good indication
that personal values have played sons role in the interpretation of nsteriel
used in the preceding work.
3 Korgenthau, Mttte» *»9^»>A<*1*> PP« 86-88

intellectual In the following wanner* The scholar hee occupied hiaeelf
la a limited fiald of work, end within this field eeefcs to discover facts
which can add to the total knowledge of the flaid in a asuner similar to
additions to an existing wotmia, 2he aoa-eehelarly intaUaotuei la aeXf
interested, or oriented, and daala with aelf thoughts, perceptions and
privilege*. Thus, while uiueh baa already been written about the role of
power and ideology in international relatione, the BBjority of the works
exsalnsd aeeaa to have been written with the a 1b of finding solutions or
asking predictions* The presence of see* political ideology in everyone
la a point which mart be considered in the review of all studies of power
and ideology as veil as in the process of a study itself* For if Ideology
is slways present, it taust be a factor in all political actions regerdlesa
of the extent to which power alone nay appear to be the predominate factor,
Tkus, s partial conclusion any he stated prior to the body of the study $
ideology in sons form and degree is always sa eleiamt in world polities*
lbs question is, how great is ite role and how do changes in the Ideology
of a period, or e political group, relate to the power aspects of that
period or group?
WN& AW CQBCEPEB 50 BE WW 21 THIS ESSAY
?QWEQ ; Power in international affaire ia of the sane nature as in other
arena of politics. In its broadest sense, end the one sneet generally
r
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aacribec to, iaaswell aad Kaplan a«y, *Power is a fon of influence which
is epeclel la that the threat of saactloaa (or their use) to force a
specific form of action la threatened or used." Laaswell end :*pien «o
on to say that power must be viewer aa a value iteelf es well aa la fesrae
of the objectives* of the uaar. It aay eleo be frcperate fross the actual
flaid la which it operetta, aa la the case of labor union power over are-
6
dactive capital.
the definitions of tbe tera power cover a continuum from the above
broad i*ege through arena where it la divided into persuasive and coercive >
to the other extreme where power la international affairs is defined solely
la term of the military sad industrial potential which can be focused oa
opponent* as a coercive force to insure their compliance with the wishes
of the stronger actor
In an exasperated teeaaer one could ssy that power Is whatever the
speaker defines it to be. The speaker need not be consistent either so
leas ss the tera Is redefined with each variant use. One aspect of the
tera on which there is agreement though la that power has the effect of
influencing the behevior of others irrespective of the exact aeaas used,
in world polities there is generally more of the coercive farce aspect of
power present then in aost domestic affaire. This seems to be due to the
availability of other influencing devices such es economic, legal sad
seelal enactions, which are not present in the seat respect in world politics.
•** •>•>«
! LsasweU * Khplan, gower and Society, London, 1952, ng« 76
6
" taesweU & KhpUa, %wt-!M&&totiU I***©*, 1952, PS* T7
' welfare, l?lseord, and, .(^^bor^^on, Bsitiaore, l#8 9 pp. W*105
Claude, &&*T
m ^JtfmaMMAJ^Wm* ** ***> 3.962, P*. 3-5
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•Enough tat end result or inriueneing otners is tne same m ww
domestic end international power, the form which power takes in these
arose is different. In the Icrastic sphere, it is authority. Is the
international ere©, it is prestige. •* Jhis difference between the for* of
internal and external power presides one basis for the qualification of
power aa either legitimete or illegitimate. In the Internal sphere, the
question of legitlasscy revolves around the ability to achieve concent with-
out a resort to force , In the internstions 1 relations sphere this criterion
is set applicable, line ability to force consent in international relations
may rest with any country which has sufficient power* Tte attempt to say
when this is le v?its*aite is a moot point, the question of legitiascy in
internetions1 power could only be considered in terns of the relation, or
similarity* between the ideologies of the nations involved* Zn other
words if the ideologies were similar, then the influence of the country
which gained consent might be called legitimate power (or prestige).
mEOLOOY : Ideology liae power covers s wide spectrum of meanings which
depend ss much on the user aa on the circumstance in which they ere used.
In e general definition, Apter has listed ideology es something more then
doctrine. It links particular actions and mundane practices with a wider
set of meanings i end by doing so lends a more honoreble end dignified com-
plexion to social conduct. wl° In s more detailed but net specific tone
^ lisbuhr; "Power end Ideology in Hsticml end International Affairs",
rem, T. a., ed., gfoeoreUeM ^j^1iftj^Jfe^.ras^ionaOl^4gn&, Hctre
Dsme, 1959, Pg. 1*»
*° Apter, Ideology end Plscentant, lew York, 19$*, pg. %&
»5«
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there 1* the ue?tuition by BrsesinsU. It is ei
grea suitable for isese consuaption, derived free*
tloae about the general nature of the dynamics en
with acne explicit guides to action for impr-
notions of the deal red eventual stete of affaire
study, Srnat Haas haa defined Ideology In the fo
propositions, more or less (in ease respect) log
what society la and what It should beoctte. It 1
political aetor (though not necessarily) of acne
the advancement of these propoeltlone la to advo
future or action which would lead to this state.
this type »re the product of an actor and not a detached observer, who
would develop whet would acre correctly be called a theory. The advocacj
involved in the propositions oust contain e coamltaent or intention to
act."12
la m&W, fljOfraflfts **«*»*« *«•* ideology as either particular
or total. 13 In this sense it will be the total MinnheiBlen concept of
Ideology which we ere dealing with when referring to the ldeologlea of
the three world power blocs later in the study.
1 I..
-Cl Md in this
jl * ., UB Bflwrrelated, about
auallv 1idvanced by a
i purpose of
itate in the
set. of propositions of
u Brsesins^i, #coAggy enQower jfa Soviet .Politics., Sew York, 1968,
pp. fc-5
** This waa taaen from the 11 Feb lecture, 106$, by Ernst Haas. The
neaning but not the wording are ea ateted in the lecture.
13 MsBoheij., M«,o^.«^..VV%&> a** *<**# 3.936, pp. ^-56
~c«
,
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HHP^Cf k theory 1* the sole property of en observer ant nsy exist ex-
clusively of what the actor say think or perceive* It is aoet ^generally
baaed on the actual behavior of the actors as seen by the observer end
any ideology which la observed ia that of the total Msnnheij&lan sense*
HCRAVEtHIC : This terra refers to the goals of stability, Justice end free-
dom. It is nominally present In all three blocs, the aorel-ethic differs
fro* nyta nslnly in that the people say not be swore of these gosls es the
ends of socio-political action. The relative importance of these three
sosls varies within the blocs es doss the age of the goals as a eorel ethic
in the blocs. Mlebuhr traces the active drive for these goaU aa being
four centuries old in the western bloc. The Cctsaunist Ideology is a re#ctl<
to the failure of the West to achieve then rapidly enough. 15ae non-aligned
Ikbloc esse into being with these goals es pert of their ideology*
*» e»eka) -
& Kiefcubr, On . Cit . > pp. lo£-110
!
Im7 ..*
cacept of the balance of power la both more In the classical
sense and more »iaunderstood. It la that eystaw in Which England of the
19th century period was considered aa holding a balance of power. Is
thie concept what wea uaaat wee that the power of the other European powers
vaa euch that regardless of how they aligned themselves, England had auffieient
power to determine the outcast of actual or potential conflicts by aligning
herself with the otherwise weaker aide. Hie purpoaa of such a situation
was to discourage conflict by having enough power to deter potential aggros-
sore from action.
j2EgWPgK£i 2hi» system la the nooerc cquivliant of the older
balance of power which aloe at amassing enough strength to deter a potential
aggressor. In addition to be*ng viewed aa a modern form of the balanea of
power, collective security la alao seen by some ea the forerunner of world
government. In general though it appears aa a transitory actuation akin
*3 Hacs, "Has Belance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda", in
Roseaau, ad., XatewMttcaeA JZ&t&im aM *%reiga Pale?* hew York, 1961
*fe Clau4e, Power e.ad.
.frfrraalftoaM jft^aa».> *** *>rk, *%&> PP- 478*88
«{$»
•
lUTIflfrLIBM AJav PffgRIAHSMi These two terms ere heard today almoet ed
na'teemm in descriptions of the trends of countries end blocs. She intent i
of any speaker i» what determines in vMcn context he la uaing the terms,
Nationalism has been summed up briefly en, *fhe acceptance of the state es
17
tilt impersonal end ultimate arbiter of human affaire* When an actor
describes nations iisro, it generally seeaa to tefca the form of a socio*
political value or myth. When advocacy or action are involved , nationalism
then beeowes an ideology. nationalises can els© be s theory vben used by
the outaide observer to describe s circumstance or series of events in an
area, the multifarious aspects of nationalism seem to almost demand the
earlier terse definition if one hopes to get a concept compact enough to
deal with other then the most specific types of considerations, the many
controversies which center around nationalism are mostly concerned with
why it occurs in the forms which it does in the pieces where it does. Whet
it is, seems to be of less concern to most discussants,end most would probably
be herd pressed to agree on its definition. For this reason, there appeals
to be little harm done in our abbreviated approach. Ttm why end where ere
also more under conaideretion here than the what.
Imperialism does not lend itself to brief summation, the differences
between whet la called imperialism today and what was imperialism in the
17 Silvert, Expectant ,People, Hew Torfc, X963, pg. 19
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i century is still not clear. Older theories aU er as the cause
uf isqpsrialiaia or the Cccrauniet theory of the need to export surplus capital
lava recently bean challenged by the social behavior* list approach of social
cue reasons for exploitation tie they social, ecoDcroic, political or racist*
Za a eaaevhet raore class leal line, Strechey has uefioec imperialism aa a
"eueeessful attempt to subjugate a People vita the intent of ruling then
for an indefinite period. ^ In modern times there has been an atteapt
avsy froB the subjugation aspects of ioperialisa sol snore of a concentra-
tion on exploitation, preferably without the outward appearance of such.
fills desire to avoid the stigs* of being labeled sa an imperialist has lad
to the use of sore subtle fonas of control. 2ne surging nationalise aaong
the new countries of the world now anises even this store discrete approach
difficult.
ttm final concept to be defined is that of the functional structural
approach to socio-political swivels. Ibis approach, while still net com-
pletely systealsed, doaa provide another way of viewing socio-political
change where societal operations are the basis for Investigation vice power.
Ideology, etc. Structures as referred to in this aysten are *xy patterns
l> Tb5d.. «?. 110&I&&* P8« 319
10*
;., :.
going goal. The key aspecta of this concept which art a»oet important in
itionel a*m modern*. The tea la of tmifc approach to social coaaye centers
around the observation that in tho traditional society there are relatival}
few structures, but each of them performs cany functions, ie., the family
la a peasant society which performs many funetlona. In modem society,
there are many atrueturea each of which la functionally apecif ic, I.e., thi
fsally in modern eociety la now the beam for vr^ few social operations out
aide child raising. (Chart 1)
the nenner to be used in exploring the question of the relation of
ideology and power is contemporary world politics will use the efcove terms
an* concepts. The relation and importance of power, Ideology, myth,
nationalism and imperialism will be diecussed both in terma of their use
within the three blocs of the present world alignment, and their effect
on and resetion to one another ea a reault of interaction between these
bloca. There will be en obvious tendency to etaphsslse a*Jar points of
world power and Ideology and a consequent alighting ot the mora detailed
caeterlal in moat areas. This tendency to generalise, reaulta from the aim
to find sons overall pattern if one exlata rather then minute case emplane*
tlone which are net broadly applicable.
AUSAB OR BLOa QP ggCK&IOsl. SPgLAiUTI
Juet as Oaul wee divided into three parte, so the world today amy be










This has been called, "She parldoxlcal power of the vet.
of Cuba end Albania to influence the actions of other pewerfui
en «x»wple of this power of the wen*.
Another wey of differentiating the three blocs of the prei
is along the lines of their structures and functions. abetter
the tenet traditional, transitional ana modern or diffuse, prii
refracted the baa ic aspects of the approach are the saae. (3e«
Under such a elsssif icatloa syatea, the tfesi
fall in the aodern (refracted) category* The Ca
partially in the transitlonel and partially in ti
non-aligued bloc would east gentrally be just tm
cim** vith sewe well into the transitional, the


















of *te ten» diffuse, eriaia»tic
in these tons.
9M nature of leadership in theee countries is soother aspect whloli
parallels functional analysis categories to a renerfceble degree. In eone
respects, it aarves aa an excellent indicator of tiai developaantal atags*
of tha political patterns of the countries. In tha tredit
Leudersbip authority rasta on tha accepts ace of tha power of tha ruler aa
legitimate ceceu&e it ia in sons aenner relatec. to tha socio-religioue
patterns of tha country. In tha transitional period, societies Bin to
bow extant dysfunctional and charismatic or totalitarian leadership* any
arise* In tha ssoOera stage the rational legil type of lea&ersiilp ia aost
ecsaaan. 'Ztmre la uauelly an air of legitimacy in this stage since fcy ita
nature tha rational-legal concept aeeuaee at least the original support





rlst# the ipfcic tecs
inclusion of these threa is the western fc]
ile power, ss eerller mentioned, bi
relations of all nations la ttoe west, tbe
been considered (due to its eeptosBis on fs
the West. ' In terns of aw earlier definitio
Is based en the apparent disappearsnoe of a ac
the intellectuals of the Western bloc. What h
MIX,
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w Xarh, I960, st
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-bare la * . * .^art sv u.
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in to:
last, fifteen years neve beea basically a cootinvstion of the contain
policy advocated by Xanana in X 'fiie Ideologically nci liised f«
uf toe pre-l>i period are cose. In their place there la a tendency
ayeteas to try end snot damans rather then reamia reactionary until
are overahelaed by the deaanAe of the naaaea. Die effect vhlen tale
maturation fro» ideologically baaed action to north baaed action has ]
the uae and concepts of power ia atill not fully clear. Pover ia as
est an element today ee it was in the past. In scant respects it ia «
te»»a*
% Cbiee* U M* 125-1*
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ablli e eerie i.i,
ae pro...,
.
Am west la act just where, whe^
j i ,: il ,..,. ...~. \ pen . .,..• m - slsa . •
1*** IB - -
the jsc a.' power l4»n solely csu.
y t» to earlier mentioned, has eqwawt power u - uuti.
govcrnatnt to as in aonscnt without reaortina to the use of force.
nrlty, It follow* that
tions a particular .•* i*
•aying, "Power In tlte last analysis swat rest capacity of plaiceI
force. Authority on the other head obteii* &i«ller canpliaocc jeceuee it
la accepted aa iegltiMStc or true. Ideology oer.ee the pact?
of Justifyins P©**** aQ* trenaforaiag it into authority. * the conclusion
which one a»y therefore draw frees this is, if ogy feoea or It* gcels
are generally realised, the authority on v -vlng po) power
A myth, by ita nature, seldom presides the rig type l;' support
needed for goals other then the stetus quo end the interna 1 *>
.' Hiebuhr, qa^Cit., pg. 108
tceseimsir, flfe^Sik, ps- a*
l6»
.
. tae «6si «
bave r**.v
ijover as . .;> in *
polities baa also feoed. la tae pest, .ysera of power la tine west b
-.ggreaslvely la external relations aea passed or t>3«a curtailed
- baa also been suggested teat ta© en Jeology u really tae 9nt
-1 silffereocoe of opinion. ThiJ v
of the West today la actually Ideology talnus its i&ilitant coiaxibees:,
ac\ la this saaae, the iaterenangeebility of tbe teras idc
figrta la prct. nearer. 2ae situation in the fcestera bloc could then U
aaSd to 'bet taut power, while preeeot ia greater eaounts V*a ever befcw
.iot use©, aa extensively aa before due to tbe deheslag of
logy, ay the reaovel of goal aan velue differences,, She replscesent of
ideology by tae awcml-etaic of aetloael isytha has not provided aa ade^uati
substitute base for tbe justification of traditional power polities.
T&f*> iJ^'WIriSlMmTiu mSSrVi
Meaunist bloe la eueyrleed cf the Sovial
of Seatern Europe. Tbe sela unifying U
gr which holds >lthe notion of e dyiswdc ;lon toward
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vhicb tae ideology i^ives vo tae uh of pows.
must be kept in saind eaeu attempting an ideoloj
MorgMttau baa »tate* w .. ia • b asvaat wvo ; - „
.
^11 pt,
in necessarily s pursuit ol power, ideologies reader :Uav«lv«aent in that
coateet for power psychologically end aurally ecceptat 4.0 to the actors and
-.-uvicay is e aultlfseed aau coapiex one, it is apparent taet the level
of belief by the aasses in su ideology is vbst debsrulaes its eetual pover
laia raises tae question in relation to tee Coosunist i to
vwtimr the ideology is s true esse for uctiou, e shea front for s distal
snip or s combination of tne tvc vniee. ass sent validity
tint is used ss s tool oy the leaders to help a*
asases in support of cue espoused goals of tae &*naatn.
la tae west today taere is oftsu stated e prealse by eertsln su&aors
teat to* Coananlet leaders ere tending easy frue fcneir aore doctrinaire
list lias end beceala*- preaortic and saatvfaat aore liberal la t
efproaea to socio-political natter* SrseainsJti is Ml this
notion sad point out taet retaer than e drift evsy froa ideology, ts*e
ohnngsw valca nave occurred as a result of personalities, domestic sad
iteessingrr, Jjti&u P*»
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tag mb lvpodlatrot to the ful. of ideological values.
CGC J the
It ale. acts as a i aysten u .lee*
an* serves v^t .. - . ..--' oatHP 8< reduciut «* wwiuM • .-.. -•- - re-
exeeation then the rule) by linking ***s-. /iet
-. a *ay mi tvo re*w. the
^« jtt. ..ternations 2
The basic $sogrsphie Units cf this bloc include, the nevly w«r»d
fro-Asian countries, India, the Middle Eastern countries end la the definec
tews of tills approach, Chins, Cuba and Yugoslavia. Use Mia reaseai for
including the last three countries is this bloc vice the Coianuniat bloc is
their foreign policies. While these three ere Coanmiat end totalitarian
In internal operation, their foreign affairs are aoat smaller to those of
the non-aligned nations. In other words, these countries strive to anlata in
an independence In world politics aa opposed to becoming ententes of
either leetera or eeatern blocs. China and Cuba seen to have further
grandiose plena frsr beconlag the leaders of new or existing regional aloes
arse*. *y. I

(As is and South America, respectively) . China's present foreign policy
indicate* that aha would like to become the leader of the entire non-aligned
lot, if possible.
The relation of ideology and power in the -sm-aiigaed countries is
vcaique because of% lack of absolute power (coercive force) such aa exist
in the other blocs. Shia lack of military and industrial capacity ia a
predominant factor la the international affairs of all these countries*
Ibough China could hardly be called wean, her industrial and military
strength relative to other major powers in international affairs is, at
present, noticeably leas. In those relatively more advanced countries of
this bloc, there is still a widespread lack of industrial and military
strength* She external relations and nolle lee of these countries are al*
most totally determined by their internal conditions and the desires of
the political elites ruling them.
She interesting point about the ideological component of the power
factor in these countries is that while they have a mobilised population,
that has fervor and commitment, they have no clearcut social blueprint
such aa ia usually the goal which inspires a ccenitamnt to action by the
amaaes. Llake has described this pseude*ideology as balm; based en interne 1
economic need end the desire of the political elites to neat these needs
while Maintaining their personal power by eppearing non-eii&serv isnt to
either the old imperialist countries or the Soviet Uteion.^ In many cases,
the elites of theme non-aliened countries ere Western educated, ibis
Wcotern education ia probably why, though they are not pro-west, they ere
3* Lis!*, *the aeatioanl of *m^li*nment% mgg&Mm» **• *<&fers,





seldoa devoted Ccewuaiata, even though wv& have a degree of Mirxlst
sffiaity. Sehraa has described this ideology in underdeveloped countries
by an acceptance of certain of tenia's ideas about Western iaperlalisa but
e rejection of th£ divisive class struggle concept, la place of this, they
opt for natlonalisst because of its mobilising ability end eleo because there
ie en octual leek of eleaeee per ee la raany of the Afro-Asisn countries.
the withdrawal of the Imperialist country sad its personnel, the political
action which this pseudo- ideology leads to is a radical liberal democracy
which without some form of outside help could not be afforded.
One continuing problem which the elites of the non-aligned bloc are
dealing with la that of how to res* In In control of a mobilised nana which*
now that it has been awakened to its condition, deeires rapid progress.
The rapidity which la cought by the assess is greater then that which can
he achieved by internal weans alone. Soon of their goals in feet are
beyond all reasonable ability of rapid fulfillment. The cry for "Hhuru" in
Kenya is one such caae.
In summing up the situstion in the non-aligned bloc, the leek of
physical power would probably head the list. The elites face e dilemma of
trying to maintain internal stability (plus increasing their legitimacy)
while Increasing International prestige, the obstacle to this latter drive
is the already mentioned lack of power.
«m»m fm m "» »•
33 schram, mj&mi&Mam. .<£ iWt9 ..aatStefcs »w ***> 1963, Pfi. 79
•
Slat* neither aa ideology nor power la the normal mm* exist la the
non-ali&ned bloc, the elites seen to feel that the taut way la which to
as lota In control and at the same tine improve the interestI one.}. p;*»etige
of their countries is to: not actually align themselves with either side,
take all the eid &ey caa get £t<m both sides, sat lata In aa outward attitude
of satsgo&i&K towards past imperialist countries to keep the susses setiafied,
sad try sad give the appearance that they mt non-aligned mtiom are actually
a anjor third force in the world. Iney would Ilka to be viewed as the aev
holder of the balance of power between the Seat and the West, but their
lack of eotual power relative to the other two blocs me&e* this e acre dis-
tant goal. Ifceir attempts at being the arbiter for the other two blocs
have else been generally unsuccessful due to this sane leak of power.
the nstariel presented thus far has bees tm attempt to show that the
present world situation is one la which there are three blocs of sonewhat
ralatnd couatriaa. the relation of power and ideology within these blocs
is aa different as mim the natures of the ideologies thsnsalves. Shern
appears little ground et this point to aasune that inter-bloc relations
night be aa extension of intra -bloc relation*. To try and find sen* higher
cceaaon denaaiaetor for under*tend lag the relationship would in ell ll*seli~
n**s result in such vague generalities as to preclude say neeniagful con-
a? ea^*^' <e*™p^e^^m e
A narrower approach, such es one which deals with power alone ea the
eol* determinant for all political action* (a la Mcrganthau, Claude, etc.)
usually fella to account for the underlying gee 13, value* and social causes
-23*
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which arc the base for the power factor Id politic*. Such *a approach as
woulc us* power only has la the past given answers or solutions eimilar to
the lav of &«as numbers* (Inis refers to the ability to predict a $o/$0
relation between heads and tail* if a cola is tossed la the air a sufficient
number of tines,} "The use of potter as the base for understanding political
action will la many cases give this sort of predictive results sad it aay
also point to steps which If taken say solve some problems* Failure to
understand the underlying social causes as well as the future problems which
any result frees an emphasis solely on power makes this approach rather
Ilk* e doctor treating the symptoms Instead of the dlseeee*
An approach which would attempt to use Ideology alone would also be
something less than complete* while ideology is an Important element of
power, It would not be able to account for situations where two eountrlee,
or blocs, has mn identical ideology but were still opposing each other in
a crisis situation*
In view of this inseparable relation between ideology and power, the
next section will examine the relative importance and interrelation of each
within the three blocs themselves,
In the West, power st present Is more important than Ideology due to
the default of the latter* The ideology of the Waat as a driving exportable
force has faded* The noa-eligmed countries, which ere the audience for
today's Western efforts, menerally tend to find the pluralistic, liberal**
democratic, capitalist doctrine, and western governmental forma of operation
-2fc-
:fl&i#*x«go fc> ratal £*ta«acr««-»»9 «K?iak' S&a* t
too «ue!t of « rich country** luxury. Item, while the elites of the boa*
oilgneu countries ere fop the aost wes «sff* educated ut in soae degree ftu"
hereats of Western morel (political) valuee, they feel that the interns!
pressure* of their countries do Dot allow tfea& to follow the patterns of
the fceet. This weens that pcwer is the seast influeacisl feetor which the
West hee at ite disposal in world politics.
One purpose of the force eleiaent ^t the West's poser Is thst of e
counterbalance for the force of the Coaaruaiet bloc, 3ft* stsleasts which
currently exists in this unitary arena hss teamed to drive the competition
between the Best end West into the ideologies! end eeonoaie eree. In this
ideological eree, the myth of the West, by its Status '4uo nature, finds it
a ifficult to ceapete for the eocsiltaaents of peoples whe vent change in repid
sweeping fores, the west therefore tries to >*ep the struggle in teras of
eorsl vslues end economic progress. In this eree, the Cosssinist "pis ia
the sky future**, is ahslleagad by the oore sdvsneed asterJal ^nogee** of
the Weet*
She West, internsily, oen be said to see its ideology (myth) es Important,
swinly due to the legitinate neture (rational- le^sl) of the existing Western
authority- In external affairs the «yth i* advocated, but physical end
eccooiaic power ere ia reality the stoat iaportsnt eleewnts in the influencing
of others.
THE COHSUMST BLOC
Xa the Ccessunist bloc, the ferae eleaeat is equal to that of the west,





by the Ccasaanista through their socialistic economic una peli-c
9mi revisionist aspect in ecemjuniat ideology is not so audi e
ftm iterxist^Xmniniat doctrines (ss earlier mentioned from Bra
rather en adaptive process to snow that the Communist ideology
correct in its abstract theory as veil es in its applicability
dmaglng conditions of everyday life (continual change being the Communist
conception cf status -<uo). Ideological changes ere sometimes explained
es prior misunderstanding of doctrine rather than as changes in the doc*
triat itself.
Hie etalemtte which exists between the East and the west in the force
area of power results in the Communists relying on the combination of en
ideology of the future and economic competition in the present. Ibis then
is their basic approach to the current international relations struggle*
the portion of the Communist Ideology which has the strongest appeal to
the non-aligned countries is that of economic policies and programs which
can be immediately used by the non-developed and under-devalopea countriee
to gain a rapid degree of economic and industrial progress*
The Communists therefore find ideology more important than power in
their external affairs. Power aa a force against the west is Important
mi inly to provide protection end propaganda. Ideology is the strong point
of the Communist policy, both internally end externally. Both its Utopian
ideals and economic aepects give it en important power factor in ne lutein*




There is one particular feature about this bloc which is acemtimes
not realised, fhii* is not a neutralist bloc as it ia often referred to.
the members of this bloc seek peace aot by neutralist nen*involvement end
supporting ideologies, but rather by specific strategies, i.e., total




Ia the relation of power and Ideology is these countries, the iaost
obvious point that steads out ia the almost complete leek of the coercive
power elssmnt which ia found in the other bloc*. Absence here la not by
choice but due to Industrie! end technological lag. Bower in other fores
is present. Dae first fern is that of world opinion. The nan-aligned
nations are the audience and consumers for which the wast and the Ctanminiets
are cempsting. Both competitors believe that they will, in the long run,
prevail. flbey feel this Islanding success in conjunction with a belief
that the other side will either change or collapse in the long run* She
basis of the interest which the two competing blocs have in the neutral
bloc is therefore three fold* First, they see* to help advance them
politically, economically end Industrially. Second, they seek to show
them what they (the competitors) believe to be the correct form of socio-
political orgeniaations and institutions. Third, they seefe to add them
to their side or sphere of influence so that any so-celled balance of
power in the sense of stability will ultimately be in their (the strongest
aides) favor.
3* Welfare, neutralism, Washington, B.C., 19&., pp. 53-5*
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the*) la one way to influence voria pontic*, litwiww ^^ **** *» ***
Ideology, or whet the non*ali*nea alttcs use for tfca iaoologieoX
con»\iiaption of the was**, in the aon-ell^saed natioae 1» baaed on a doe-
trlat of econoaic aevaiopattat, national!** and reciaa. She l*«t item,
racism, being • reaction to paet colonial experience* where visit* aupre-
aaey wae » beaic eleaent of iaperlal control. Another factor which date:
aifltd the present ideology of the non-aligned nation© i« the manner in
which they emerged and achieved their Independence. She Second world a*:
saw the weakening of the actual power of the imperial cotaatriee te eueh
e degree that they were aot in the total control of their colonics after
the war ee they were prior to it. In eon* eeaee, they ware abeent axsri
the war period while the Axle aetiona controlled theee ereee, their
attempted return after the war wee fctss than etrong, both due to their
weakened pcaitlon ana the increaeed realetanc* of the local popala*
tioa*. thia ineraaaed reaietance resulted from a change* attitude on
the part of tha aeeaea. It steamed fits their oeaewtioo that the iaper
laliate war* aot invincible aa waa felt to fee the eas* prior to the war.
tha Internal evaat which in moat caeea spar*ed the lecal movements
for independence waa the return of the native elitea from etudy in the
wait. In the K*st theae elitea had not only acquired en education but a

f t
'3»se change* took the forw ox* aoveaanU for nations ^ination.
•Ine aobllisation of the bmim to 6 this pattern chaos* was
diffieult for the elites to achieve *iacc the oppression and expl-
atioa of the layerialistd was « v«ry reel thing in the salads of the local
population*. Juee Mobilised, however, the kwmi wart not satisfied to
equality with the other nations caf the voriu
of the aetionalist Bcveanat. This put tba elites in a position of also
having to becoa* the laagers of these new drives or being by-passed by
the aovesamt sad perfasps overthrown* The situation of a surfe? on the
crest of a wave la a goal analogy. % taking the lead, one caa ride a
wave to its end, failure to do so will result in either "being left behind
la the backwater or being toppled.
The relative position of what is celled Ideology and power in the
eon-aligned countries any he seen* in terns of the previous discussion*
sa being reversed by conparison to the other two bines. She negative
power which the non-aligned nations possess is used by the elites to help







They wsc their lac£. of actual power as* responsibility ee a 3
the real power ond ideology of the other blocs to attain the:!
conscious affort by the Western and Crsmmlst blocs net to ui
power to gala allies in the non-align©4 bloc is what permits
to continue to operate la too aaaoer they do* World opinion
•t beat a nebulous concept) also acta as a brake on the use c
the two power blocs when dealing with the non-aligmd bloc.
thersfore, within tJtia third bloc the relative iaqeertaac
and power cannot be definitely detenaiasd since neither e*i»l
context. Ttub, there i<> a substitute) for both and these are
lotions with the other blocs. When views** along with the r*J






In the world today, there is *m ideological and a power struggle
is progress, the ideology of Ccewuniaai versus that of western cspi.tsiist
;
deaeerecy. The battleground for this atruggle is the eaerging under*
developed am non-developed countries of the Afro^Aatan end Kiddle Eastern
areas. The realisation of the true nature of thia atruggle boa bees alew
in eaerging in the West* Per a long tic* the West failed to see the in-
applicability of na i*ieoiogy (nyth) to the condition* ia the aon«eligned
countries. A second probles which the West faced in this area was the
lad ideological iaege which it had as e result of peat imperial operations
In the nen-elisned areas* The adaptive nature of the Ccaaauaiet ideolngy
ess! their flexible power taployaeat ala© heightened the distaste for the
West which assy of the non-aligned countries developed before the West
becean aware of the situation there.
Has realisation of this situation led the West to try and play down
power politic* and cleanse its ideological fcasge. the results of this
approach sere cot encouraging from the VesVs point of view. United
stetea preseure for liquidation of the British and French empires and the
loss of control ct the Suss canal era examples of this approach sad its
results. In the short run (up to the present tijaa) the results of tMS
approach have been negative. At soae future tian, there nay he sew
interest paid on this iavestaaat fey the Wast, hut that will reasin to he
One area where the West has been unable to effectively compete with
the Conewriist Ideology is that of the Utopian Sdee of the future. While
is the West sad to a leaser degree in the Coaanmist area itself, it seeaa
to be agreed that no total utopla ia Just around the corner, there is still
a eertein appeal which thia Idea has for the starving oppreased aasaes
ef the eanrging nations. Was collective nature of the aoeio-eoonoinic

rallure of the -teat to appreciate tbo aituetlon end the aim* and
fee non-aligned countries la difficult to understand in
enuneratlon at the 1?5> Sendung Conference of a
i«
Lfe.faver list* %m folic* lag as the principal goals, values and
strategies of the eoc-filigned bloc: enlightenec national aaIf -interest,
a» the nest accurate neias that describe t; their apprt
profit frcas tha cold war; a auparior feeling and acre preetifB* then other
swell countries which fell within the spheres of either of the other teo
bloea; nen-ellgniatttt aa a way to perrait the use of all ere liable reeourees
for interns 1 purpoees rather then using them to eld whichever larger
nation they night become en elly of; staying out of struggles vhlch are
of no real intercut to their country itself, aa an ally one stands the
rial-, of being the battleground for such a clean* i.e., the devastation In
Korea after najor powers fought there; the lest goal which the non-«Hgned
hee taJasn for Iteelf is that of a potential balancer of power bctacen
the other t»o blocs, or at leaat the arbiter for the disputes between
thea.'
1
" This last goal seen* sow tine off ainee the third bloc presently
* the relative power to echieve such a poait;
35 tjetmver, "Bshru, Iteaeer end Hkrunah on Meutrelisn*, SButral lav., ed»
ife*s, Weahlngton, I9&, pp. </
_
;V»i,«..i, <*r%
itt actually * eTBuerel egri
a ISCfc Of iaevlc&icai
the w.iru bloc. First, U
ilA,, X»ti< i -rule, eeo
power fees
it Kitfht weal
finally e aeslrc not to be truly aeutrai tut actively am-
is last approach will probably cositiauc until eaott*£i actual
an acquired lay e country a© that it can dial vita others on
is e^uai level*
She elites ere using the ebove goal* lilse aa ideology. It ie the
tegitimtiaft base for their internal authority a*» t**ir tool for el
extendi prestige. iart*th of actual legitiaate authority ana prestige
ae« see* ehenge In tee toee ana use of the j*«i which is
nov the aeia crutch for their actions.) Sals policy of uon-eUgnwant
haa eerteia aiaHiarities with that which the United State* followed in
its early yeera before it had either reel authority or prestigt.
Ttm iaterreaetio»hip between ideology end power ia worl& peUtic*
today is little changea from vh* t it has batsa la the past, ideology
atUX serves ea a base for power and as a justification for itf w, What
•S3-

mtM <• lf4W<M* * • impmmmi
*r this tread.
***rr u3fi,js and social »c 'Sent observers see a dagger ia this present




as sash st present. Golfers he* pointed e**t that the id* *1 and
economic ooBpetitlon presently ia progress is the noa-ellgaed countries,
vhile shiftlag the eagfcesle awey free power ia the short run, aey is the
long rua aeuee s s»eh sharper re-<ttsergeaee of pewer politics if one uloe
should flad itself loosing the non-power struggle sad thereby ending up
«t s serious diesdnantsse relative to the otae s newer potential.
fae reference here is to the West If the aon~elig«ed bloc should eventwelly
ally Iteelf with the Cceaaaaiat fcloe es s result of tte prsee
sad ideological struggle tskiag place.
She relative lsiportaaee of power sad ideology any \m suaned up ia
the following points. Power ia the Western sad CoBenaniet blocs is similar
la asture sad generally equal in strength, fhere U less stress on




arena. r : ^ k»e * ^laBRieal an aee<
panylH rsl*BWi to a :'•• "*^- *et taai i 1 ;-'':ii -- sliav .'
n whose ^bowRitwnt aoccrv *•'*?#
Cesemaii 1 4* "fewl ftvttfk ^^Ka^' 1
I V- A lH,". .JfT.
jioa'
tic sad '..<-: '.'•' - .".. "'.. toetl tin tot
a aree In which the future iAec&ocieal
their dmt position*
wy be concluded that vh«t la actually goin
between the Meat and the Gcaaeaniate
agy. they are act strong enough either gee
regain trusty neutral* their apBroeah (etrat
.tree between the other tee a* .lor aloe* which i
non-eliaaed end at the sane ttoe receive the s»1
Internal scoocaiio and Industrial progress. Succ
peradlte the rulihg elites ta the non-aligned
trol end thereby lead their countries towards tJ
betteraant and political independence.
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